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1.	 Stakeholder	 cooperation	 can	 be	 vital	 in	 managing	 conservation	 conflicts.	






about	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 a	 conflict-reduction	 intervention;	 (b)	 administrative	
uncertainty	about	intervention	funding;	or	(c)	political	uncertainty	about	the	extent	
of	community	support.	We	applied	these	scenarios	to	a	conservation	conflict	in	the	
Outer	Hebrides,	 Scotland,	 involving	 the	management	 of	 geese	 to	 simultaneously	
meet	both	conservation	and	farming	objectives.	We	asked	149	crofters	(small-scale	
farmers)	 if	 they	would	commit	 to	cooperate	with	others	by	helping	 fund	a	goose	
management	plan	given	the	three	sources	of	uncertainty.
3.	 On	 average,	 intention	 to	 cooperate	 was	 highest	 (99%)	 in	 scenarios	 without	
uncertainty,	 and	 lowest	 under	 administrative	 uncertainty	 (77%).	 Scientific	
uncertainty	and	political	uncertainty	both	had	less	of	an	effect,	with	over	95%	of	




4.	 Synthesis and applications.	Crofters’	intention	to	cooperate	is	high	but	lessened	by	




need	for	 researchers	and	government	advisers	 to:	 (a)	determine	how	uncertainty	
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Webber	 (1973)	describe	 three	broad	sources	of	uncertainty	 in	 so-
cial	ecological	systems	(SES):	scientific	uncertainty	from	incomplete	




eration	 in	 collective-	action	 problems	 (Cárdenas	 &	Ostrom,	 2004),	
including	 in	 the	presence	or	 absence	of	 uncertainty.	 For	 example,	





unteers	 in	 a	 laboratory	 setting	will	 act	 differently	 to	 stakeholders	
in	a	real-	world	situation	 (Levitt	&	List,	2007).	Working	with	stake-
holders	 involved	 in	 a	 conservation	 conflict	 (rather	 than	 with	 vol-
unteers)	and	framing	the	experiment	in	a	way	which	reflects	a	real	




entific	 uncertainty,	 administrative	 uncertainty	 and	 political	 uncer-
tainty)	influence	the	intention	to	cooperate,	of	people	in	a	real-	life	
conservation	conflict.
Conservation	 conflicts	 involving	 the	 damage	 of	 crops	 by	 wild-
life	 are	 widespread	 globally	 (Treves,	 Wallace,	 Naughton-Treves,	 &	
Morales,	 2006).	 In	Northern	 Europe,	 reduction	 of	 agricultural	 yield	
due	to	grazing	of	wild	geese	 is	a	well-	documented	problem	(Cusack	
et	al.,	 2018;	 Simonsen,	 Tombre,	 &	Madsen,	 2017).	Methods	 for	 re-
ducing	 goose	 damage	 to	 crops	 include	 regulating	 population	 (e.g.	
shooting),	non-	lethal	scaring	or	providing	sacrificial	feeding	areas	(Fox,	
Elmberg,	Tombre,	&	Hessel,	2016).	Stakeholders	involved	in	a	goose	





been	 identified	 an	 important	 step	 in	understanding	 the	 context	 for	





on	goose	management	 in	 the	Outer	Hebrides,	 Scotland.	Resident	
greylag	goose	(Anser anser)	numbers	have	been	increasing	steadily	









is	 recognised	 by	 the	 Scottish	Government	 as	 being	 vital	 in	main-
taining	the	population	of	remote	areas,	supporting	local	businesses	
and	 managing	 important	 natural	 habitats	 (Scottish	 Government,	
2016).	 Crofters	 (farmers	 of	 croft	 land)	 impacted	 by	 geese	 essen-
tially	 take	 part	 in	 a	 form	of	 public	 goods	 game,	where	 they	 each	
choose	whether	to	voluntarily	contribute	to	the	maintenance	of	a	
non-	excludable,	 non-	rivalrous	 public	 good	 (cooperate	with	 goose	
management	 by	 contributing	 to	 scaring	 actions)	 or	 not	 (defect).	







1.	 examine	 how	 crofters’	 intention	 to	 cooperate	 was	 influenced	




will	 impact	 intention	 of	 stakeholders	 to	 cooperate;	 and	 (b)	 take	 steps	 (such	 as	
uncertainty	reduction,	communication	or	acceptance)	to	reduce	the	negative	impact	
of	uncertainty	on	cooperation.
K E Y W O R D S
conflict,	conservation	management,	decision-making,	experimental	economics,	goose,	public	
goods	game,	uncertainty
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2  | MATERIAL S AND METHODS
2.1 | Study area
North	Uist,	Benbecula	and	South	Uist	(hereafter,	the	Uists),	are	part	
of	 the	Outer	Hebrides;	 an	 island	chain	off	 the	northwest	 coast	of	
Scotland,	UK.	The	Uists	provide	year-	round	habitat	for	greylag	geese	














eral	 hours	 a	 day	 in	 designated	 areas,	 carrying	out	 lethal	 and	non-	











to	 capture	 qualitative	 responses	 accurately.	 Information	 from	
crofters	 on	 themselves,	 their	 crofting	 and	 their	 experiences	 of	
goose	 impact	was	 collected	using	 a	 structured	questionnaire,	 to	
allow	 statistical	 analyses	 on	 the	 data	 collected	 (Newing,	 2011).	
For	full	recruitment,	pilot	and	collection	methods,	see	Supporting	








were	 unwilling	 to	 pay	were	 asked	 to	 give	 reasons.	 The	 responses	
were	then	coded	post-	hoc	using	theoretical	thematic	analysis	(Braun	
























crease	of	negative	goose	 impact	 (Cd)	down	to	half	 the	current	 im-
pact	levels.	The	WTP	amount	(Cwtp)	previously	stated	by	the	crofter	
was	 for	 100%	 reduction	 in	 negative	 goose	 impact.	 Therefore,	 the	
cost	to	each	crofter	(Cmp)	of	a	management	plan	which	achieved	half	




This	 resulted	 in	a	 total	payoff	 to	 the	crofter	of	Cd	+	Cmp	=	0.5Cwtp 
+	0.25Cwtp	=	0.75Cwtp.	However,	the	hypothetical	management	plan	
needed	 the	 number	 of	 crofters	 signing	 up	 (Nc)	 to	 be	 at	 least	 half	
of	all	 the	crofters	 in	the	Uists	 (N).	 If	 this	threshold	 (Nc/N)	was	not	
reached,	 crofters	did	not	pay	 anything	 (Cmp	=	0)	 but	 there	was	no	
goose	impact	reduction	(Cd	=	Cwtp),	so	total	payoff	is	Cd	+	Cmp	=	Cwtp 
+	0	=	Cwtp.	Choosing	to	defect	always	set	Cmp	=	0.	The	crofter	then	






managers’	 incomplete	 knowledge	 of	 goose	 ecology	 resulting	 in	
uncertainty	to	impact	reduction,	Cd.
•	 The	‘Administrative’	scenario	was	described	as	representing	man-
agers’	 incomplete	knowledge	of	public	 funding	 for	 the	manage-
ment	plan	resulting	in	uncertainty	to	the	cost	of	the	plan	to	the	
crofter,	Cmp.















cooperate,	 they	 would	 write	 ‘10’	 in	 each	 of	 the	 ‘46%–50%’	 and	
‘51%–55%’	cells.	If	the	crofter	felt	they	could	not	estimate	or	they	
felt	there	was	an	equal	chance	of	all	outcomes,	they	would	write	‘1’	
in	each	of	 the	20	cells.	A	 fixed	wager	allowed	crofters	 to	express	




well	 as	 which	 background	 and	 impact	 experience	 characteristics	
most	strongly	predict	intent	to	cooperate,	we	ran	four	linear	mixed	
effects	models.	Analyses	were	 focused	on	how	 intention	to	coop-
erate	 and	WTP	 for	 goose	management	 were	 influenced	 by	 three	
groups	of	variables.	Firstly,	the	value	a	crofter	places	on	cooperation	
may	depend	on	their	current	situation	 including	size	of	their	croft,	
the	 extent	 of	 their	 crofting	 experience	 or	 their	 existing	 access	 to	
goose	management	support	via	the	croft	owner	or	LGMG.	Secondly,	
intention	to	cooperate	may	stem	from	wanting	to	mitigate	personal	
impacts	 of	 geese	 such	 as	 time	 and	money	 costs.	We	 also	 include	
variables	to	capture	crofters	wishing	to	mitigate	goose	 impacts	on	






predictor	 and	 random	 variables	 thought	 relevant	 to	 that	 analysis.	
The	function	‘dredge’	(r	package	MuMin)	was	then	used	on	the	global	
models	to	build	and	rank	models	by	finite-	sample	corrected	Akaike	
information	 criteria	 values	 (AICc)	 calculated	 using	maximum	 likeli-
hood.	No	interactions	between	variables	resulted	in	a	better	fitted	
model,	according	 to	AICc.	Best-	fitting	models	 (ΔAICc	<	2)	were	 re-
tained	and	were	then	standardised	by	dividing	the	continuous	fixed	
variables	 by	 two	 standard	 deviations	 allowing	 direct	 comparison	







Scenario Cooperation threshold Cooperate Defect
Baseline Nc	<	0.5N Cmp = 0 
Cd	=	Cwtp











Nc	<	0.5N Cmp = 0 
Cd	=	Cwtp












Nc	<	0.5N Cmp = 0 
Cd	=	Cwtp











Nc	<	Thuc Cmp = 0 
Cd	=	Cwtp











old	 number	 of	 crofters	 choosing	 “cooperate”	 required	 for	 management	 plan	 to	 be	 enacted	 under	 uncertainty;	 Thlow	=	0.25N,	 low	 threshold;	
Thhigh	=	0.75N,	high	threshold.
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variable	to	assess	the	ability	of	each	model	to	correctly	discriminate	
between	a	randomly	chosen	positive	response	and	a	randomly	cho-
sen	 negative	 response.	 A	 value	 of	 0.7	 or	 greater	 was	 considered	
as	 having	 acceptable	 discriminatory	 ability	 (Sommerville,	 Milner-
Gulland,	Rahajaharison,	&	Jones,	2010).
All	model	analyses	were	done	 in	RStudio	version	1.0.136,	 run-




Two	global	models	were	 built	 to	 investigate	 intention	 to	 cooperate.	
The	first	willingness	to	pay	(WTP)	global	model	included	all	crofters,	
whereas	the	second	only	included	those	advancing	to	the	cooperation	













2.7 | Willingness to pay – amount
The	WTP	amount	 global	model	 used	 the	 same	predictor	 and	 ran-
dom	variables	as	the	WTP	global	model	above.	The	response	vari-
able	was	amount	WTP	 in	British	Pounds.	We	used	a	 zero-	inflated	




2.8 | Perception of others’ intention to cooperate
Predictor	 variables	 included	 in	 this	 global	model	were	 the	 same	 as	
for	 the	 cooperation	 scenario,	 with	 the	 addition	 of	 the	 measure	 of	
how	crofters	compared	their	own	goose	damage	with	that	of	others	
(Table	2,	 IG7)	 and	 a	 binary	 predictor	 (cooperate/defect)	 variable	
indicating	 if	 the	 crofter	had	chosen	 to	 cooperate	 themselves	under	
the	equivalent	scenario.	We	again	used	GLMMs	with	binomial	error	
structure	 and	 a	 logit	 link.	Data	were	 collected	 as	 a	wager.	Crofters	












Groups of variables Variables measured (units)
Crofting	experience 
R epresenting individuals’ connection 














R epresenting the range of direct 























R epresenting engagement with formal 
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predictor	variables)	of	each	best	fitted	model	and	predicted	effect	





82.6%)	 were	 WTP	 for	 goose	 management.	 Reasons	 for	 crofters	
being	UTC	are	shown	in	Table	5.	The	most	common	reason	under	no	
uncertainty	was	that	geese	did	not	affect	them	enough.	In	the	pres-













no	 significant	 difference	 (assessed	 by	AICc)	 between	models	with	
and	without	the	random	variable.	The	AUC	of	the	ROC	was	0.72.
Under	all	 treatments	of	the	cooperation	scenario,	most	crofters	
were	WTP	 for	 goose	 management.	 Under	 the	 uncertainty	 scenar-
ios,	 type	 of	 uncertainty	was	 the	 only	 significant	 predictor	 variable	
for	 intention	 to	cooperate	 (Figure	1,	Table	3).	 In	 the	absence	of	un-
certainty	 (baseline),	predicted	probability	of	cooperation	was	>0.98	
(Table	4).	The	presence	of	each	of	the	three	types	(scientific,	admin-
istrative	 and	 political)	 significantly	 decreased	 the	 predicted	 proba-
bility	of	 cooperation	compared	 to	 the	baseline.	The	greatest	effect	
was	seen	in	the	administrative	scenario	(P(coop)	=	0.77),	followed	by	
small	but	significant	effects	with	scientific	(P(coop)	=	0.93)	and	polit-






3.2 | Willingness to pay – amount
The	modal	WTP	amount	was	£50	per	year	and	the	mean	£59.81	per	
year.	Cost	of	goose	scaring	(time)	and	concern	for	others	suffering	




and	 those	 indicating	 concern	 for	 others	 would	 pay	 £52.27.	 The	
model	 variance	 attributable	 to	 crofter	 location	 (random	 variable)	
was	0.13	(Table	S4).
3.3 | Perception of others’ intention to cooperate
Individual	 cooperation,	 type	of	uncertainty,	membership	of	SCF	and	
perceived	 relative	 level	 of	 goose	 damage	 (Figure	1,	 Table	3)	were	 all	
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Compared	to	a	baseline	(of	individual	cooperation,	no	uncertainty,	no	
membership	of	SCF	and	a	perceived	average	 level	of	goose	damage,	
P(coop)	=	0.93),	 the	 presence	 of	 each	 type	 of	 uncertainty	 had	 a	
negative	 effect	 on	 predicted	 probability	 of	 cooperation	 (Table	4).	
Again,	 the	 greatest	 effect	was	 seen	with	 administrative	 uncertainty	





no	 significant	 impact,	 compared	 to	 those	 who	 had	 a	 perception	 of	
average	damage.	Compared	 to	 the	baseline	model,	 crofters	who	did	
not	 cooperate	 themselves	 were	 less	 likely	 to	 predict	 others	 would	
cooperate	also	(P(coop)	=	0.10).	Fixed	variables	account	for	27%	of	the	





4.1 | How uncertainty affects crofters’ intention to 
cooperate
When	 faced	 with	 a	 choice	 of	 discrete	 courses	 of	 action,	 people	
generally	 select	 those	 with	 lower	 uncertainty	 (Kahneman	 &	
Tversky,	 1979;	 Lundhede,	 Jacobsen,	 Hanley,	 Strange,	 &	 Thorsen.,	
2015).	 This	 expectation	 is	 supported	 by	 our	 findings,	 with	 the	
presence	 of	 scientific	 uncertainty	 (from	 incomplete	 knowledge	 of	
the	 research	system),	administrative	uncertainty	 (surrounding	cost	
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Reason
Scenario type (number of non- cooperation responses)
Cooperation scenario
WTP (34) Scientific (13) Admin. (29) Political (7)
The	issue	doesn’t	affect	
me	enough
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for	 accessing	 benefits	 without	 contribution.	 The	 small	 effect	 size	
means	 we	 cannot	 separate	 decreased	 probability	 of	 cooperation	
under	political	uncertainty	from	the	general	negative	utility	experi-
enced	from	any	type	of	uncertainty	(Lundhede	et	al.,	2015).
















between	 individuals	 (Sutherland	 &	 Burton,	 2011),	 which	 can	 de-
crease	behaviour	perceived	as	unfair	(Ostrom,	2010).
The	mean	WTP	 amount	 of	 £59.81	per	 year	was	 similar	 to	 the	
£29.67	 per	 year	 (£44.27,	 adjusted	 for	 inflation)	 which	 Hanley,	




goose	 scaring	 is	 resource-	intensive,	 as	 the	 geese	 repeatedly	 be-
come	accustomed	to	the	methods	used	which	then	must	be	changed	







in	 the	same	direction	and	 in	 the	same	rank	order	as	with	crofters’	
own	choices.	Individual	crofters	believed	other	crofters	in	the	Uists	
would	act	similarly	to	themselves	and	did	not	indicate	they	thought	









how	 goods	 may	 be	 embedded	 in	 one	 another	 (Hausman,	 2012).	










have	 a	 significant	 influence	on	WTP	amount	 (Pearce	 et	al.,	 2002).	












extended	 beyond	 themselves	 to	 promoting	 the	 community	 as	 a	
whole.	Separating	bias	from	the	social	norms	which	we	are	trying	to	
study	is	an	ongoing	challenge	in	field	studies	such	as	this.
4.5 | Management implications of multiple system 
uncertainties
The	 three	 sources	 of	 uncertainty	 affected	 crofters’	 intention	 to	
cooperate	 in	 different	 ways.	 In	 the	 presence	 of	 administrative	
uncertainty,	 defecting	 crofters	 indicated	 that	 other	 groups	 should	
shoulder	some	of	the	burden	caused	by	uncertainty.	In	the	presence	
of	 scientific	 uncertainty,	 no	 actions	 by	 any	 other	 group	 were	
mentioned	as	being	involved	in	crofter	cooperation.	In	the	presence	
of	political	uncertainty	 (and	 in	general),	 cooperating	crofters	were	
confident	 that	 others	 would	 act	 like	 them	 and	 not	 try	 to	 gain	
benefits	without	 contributing.	 Prior	 to	management	 actions	 being	
developed,	 an	 important	 step	 is	 for	 managers	 to	 understand	 the	
societal	 dimensions	 of	 a	 conflict,	 including	 stakeholder	 roles	 and	
actions	(Young	et	al.,	2016a).	Our	study	shows	that	managers	should	
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also	include	an	assessment	of	how	stakeholders’	actions	may	change	
under	 different	 sources	 of	 uncertainty,	 especially	 if	 sources	 are	
associated	with	particular	stakeholder	groups.
Once	 relationships	 are	 better	 understood,	 steps	 can	 then	 be	
taken	 to	 cope	 with	 uncertainty.	 Firstly,	 uncertainty	 could	 be	 re-
duced	by	filling	scientific	research	gaps	such	as	the	relative	efficacy	
of	scaring	techniques	or	goose	crop	selectivity	(Fox	et	al.,	2016).	But	
the	 application	 of	 increased	 ecological	 knowledge	 alone	may	 have	
suboptimal	 impact	on	conflict	 if	other	 types	of	uncertainty	are	not	
also	addressed.	Reducing	reliance	on	uncertain	external	funding	by	

















tablished	 through	 formation	 of	 the	 multi-	stakeholder	 LGMG	 and	
previous	 commitment	 to	 the	 5-	year	 adaptive	 management	 pilot.	
The	current	 level	of	 cooperation	between	stakeholders	may	be	at	
risk	 if	 future	 goose	management	 plans	 cannot	 reduce	 administra-
tive	uncertainty	(for	example,	by	securing	funding)	nor	demonstrate	
commitment	 to	 the	 project	 (for	 example,	 by	 enshrining	 another	
multi-	year	plan).
5  | CONCLUSIONS
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